Today's American mercantile pressure on China to appreciate the renminbi against the dollar is eerily similar to the American pressure on Japan to appreciate the yen that began over 30 years ago. Indeed, the yen went all the way from 360 to the dollar in August 1971, at the end of the Bretton Woods period of fixed exchange rate parities, to touch 80 to the dollar in April 1995. Then the American government relented and announced a strong dollar policy that signaled the end of "Japan bashing". But the overvalued yen, and the expectation of appreciation, destabilized the Japanese financial system; the bubble economy of the late 1980s was followed by a deflationary slump and a zero-interest liquidity trap in the 1990s [McKinnon and Ohno 1997] .
At least some of today's critics of East Asian countries' pegging to the dollar would agree that international saving imbalances rather than misaligned exchange rates are the root cause of the U.S. current-account deficit. One can argue whether it is mainly a saving deficiency in the United States or a saving glut in the rest of the world [Bernanke 2005] . Either way, the central position of the United States under the world dollar standard gives it alone an unlimited international line of credit in its own currency.
However, suppose that the U.S. trade deficit is misdiagnosed to result from a misaligned exchange rate, so that a surplus country on the dollar's periphery is forced to appreciate against the world's dominant money. It will suffer a slowdown in economic 1 Thanks to Nan Li, Hong Qiao, and Gunther Schnabl for their invaluable support. 1 growth including imports and eventually deflation [McKinnon 2005] , with no predictable effect on its trade surplus [Qiao, 2005] -as with Japan from the 1970s to the mid 1990s.
Since 2000, China bashing has not yet caused significant exchange appreciation despite a bill introduced into the U.S. Congress in March 2005 to impose a 27.5 percent tariff on all Chinese imports unless the renminbi is appreciated. However, after keeping the renminbi fixed at 8.28 yuan per dollar for more than 10 years during a period of very high growth and declining inflation, the People's Bank of China (PBC) announced on 21
July, 2005 that the rate would become more "flexible"-and allowed a 2.1 percent appreciation. Subsequent appreciation has been very small. The PBC has kept a tight rein on the spot exchange rate within a narrow trading range of ± 0.3 percent. More important is the announcement effect, which increased the probability of future appreciations.
Indeed, on 25 November 2005, the PBC liberalized capital controls enough to create a swap market in forward exchange. With the spot rate at 8.08 yuan per dollar, it sold $6 billion to a group of 10 domestic banks and promised to buy the dollars back one year hence at 7.85 yuan per dollar. This forward discount on the dollar of 2.9 percent implies that the PBC will tolerate gradual ongoing annual spot appreciations cumulating to a total of 2.9 percent in any one year. However, great uncertainty is involved: actual appreciation could be more or less, and it could be gradual or more discrete. American critics want much greater appreciation, closer to 20 percent [Bergsten et al 2005] .
The upshot is that market participants now know that the renminbi will be higher against the dollar in the future: a one-way bet reinforced by China's growing trade surplus and foreign pressure. This expectation itself can influence China's economy even before substantial appreciation actually occurs. To show this, I first analyze the link 2 between wage bargaining and productivity growth as they affect international competitiveness. Second, the implications for interest rates in China's not-yet-fully liberalized financial markets, where falling into a zero interest liquidity trap is quite possible, are explored. A useful benchmark is the earlier behavior of Japanese wages and interest rates in the face of a one-way bet on yen appreciation.
Wage Adjustment under a Fixed Exchange Rate
International saving imbalances aside, suppose a country such as China with low wages but very high productivity growth, trades with a country such as the U.S. with much lower productivity growth but higher real wages. When wages are "sticky" as traditional theory would have it, isn't exchange rate flexibility with ongoing appreciation of the renminbi more or less necessary to balance international competitiveness?
In the high-growth economy, however, wages are flexible. When wages grow about 10 percent per year, first differences are high relative to wage levels. International competitiveness can be roughly balanced in the short run when high quarterly wage increases match high productivity growth. In the very long run, the level of money wages in the high growth peripheral country converges to their level in the slower growing center. But the key is to ensure that monetary and exchange rate conditions are right so that high wage growth accurately reflects productivity gains.
In the 1950s and 1960s under the Bretton Woods system of fixed dollar exchange rates, how differential wage growth became the mode of international adjustment was first articulated for high-growth Scandinavia when the Swedish, Norwegian, and Danish currencies were all pegged to the dollar. But very high productivity growth in postwar Japan relative to the United States, when the yen/dollar rate was also convincingly fixed from 1949 to 1971, provided an equally striking example of what is now known as the Scandinavian Model (SM) of wage adjustment [Lindbeck, 1979] . When the high growth country's dollar exchange rate is credibly fixed, the SM has four key features:
(1) Relative purchasing power parity holds: inflation in tradable goods prices converges to that in the center country, in whose currency most world trade is invoiced.
(2) Productivity growth in tradable (exportable) manufactures is higher than in the rest of the high-growth economy.
(3) Employers in manufacturing, subject to the fixed exchange rate constraint, naturally bid up wages to fully reflect the higher productivity growth in manufacturing.
(4) The high wage growth in manufactures then spreads out into the nontradables sector, where productivity growth is less, causing prices there to increase-the now classic Balassa-Samuelson effect.
When the yen was fixed at 360 to the dollar from 1950 to 1971 under Bretton Woods, the importance of relative wage adjustment between Japan and the United States was pronounced. In that period, Japan's annual growth in real output was 9.45 percent while industrial production grew an astonishing 14.6 percent-much like China's more recently. Unsurprisingly, the annual growth in Japan's labor productivity of 8.9 percent was far in excess of America's 2.6 percent. However, the balancing item was that average money wages grew at a robust rate of 10 percent per year in Japan and only 4.5 percent in the U.S. In Japan's manufacturing export sector with its extremely high growth in labor productivity, employers bid vigorously for both skilled and unskilled workers-4 subject to remaining internationally competitive at the fixed exchange rate. From 1950 to 1971, Figure 1 shows the dramatic rise of Japanese relative to American money wages. 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 Japan USA -10% -5% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 1 9 5 0 1 9 5 3 1 9 5 6 1 9 5 9 1 9 6 2 1 9 6 5 1 9 6 8 1 9 7 1 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 7 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 1 Keeping the yen at 360 per dollar effectively anchored Japan's price level for tradable goods. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Japanese wholesale price index (WPI) rose less than 1 percent per year, whereas the American WPI rose a bit more than 1 percent.
Because the bulk of world trade was invoiced in dollars, fixing an exchange rate to the dollar was (is) a stronger anchor for Japan's price level than the size of Japanese bilateral trade with the United States would have suggested. In addition, figure 2 shows the relatively high wage growth in Japan during the fixed rate period tailing off sharply to become less than that in the United States after the yen began to appreciate. 
The Negative Risk Premium in Wage Growth
Suppose we modify our Scandinavian model of wage determination to introduce the expectation of renminbi appreciation, but the precise amount is uncertain. Because risk-averse employers in export activities don't know how much the renminbi will actually appreciate, they hesitate to bid money wages up by the full amount of productivity growth in tradables. A Chinese exporter could go bankrupt if he bid up incremental wages too strongly only to find that the renminbi appreciated more than his mean expectation. Let us call this shortfall in wage growth the negative risk premium in wage bargaining, WRP < 0. Starting from a position where the domestic price level in China is stable (as was approximately true in 2005), wages increase according to
∆W = E(∆PROD) + E(∆S) + WRP
( 1) where W is money wages in China, PROD is (real) labor productivity, S is yuan/dollar; ∆ is the operator for percentage change, and E is the expectations operator. E(∆S) < 0 reflects expected appreciation, and E(∆PROD) > 0 reflects high productivity growth.
If the rate of appreciation was certain, say the renminbi was sure to appreciate by 2.9 percent per year, then WRP = 0. Money wages would increase less than productivity growth by 2.9 percentage points. On a balanced deflation path, prices would fall 2.9 per year while real wages grew as much as labor productivity.
But the rate of renminbi appreciation in China is uncertain, so that WRP < 0. It is still too soon (2005) (2006) to get any firm estimate of the shortfall in wage increases in
China from the uncertainty in exchange appreciation. However, the earlier Japanese experience of massive actual appreciations after 1970, which only later became more or less fully anticipated, provides a very rough comparison. Figure 2 shows the breakdown in relative wage adjustment-albeit with a lag. Before 1975, money wage growth in Japan remained much higher than in the United States. Subsequently, as relative deflation in Japan set in (particularly from the sharp rise in the yen in 1977-78), Japan's money wage growth slowed sharply. From 1980 to the present time, Japanese wage growth has been even lower than that in the United States. The erratically appreciating yen undermined the natural process of relative wage adjustment for balancing international competitiveness between Japan and the United States, and the resulting deflationary pressure severely depressed the Japanese economy in its "lost decade" of the 1990s.
The Negative Risk Premium in Interest Rates
Capital markets are known to be forward-looking, even more so than labor markets. So assuming that China continues with its liberalization of foreign exchange controls, and the People's Bank of China (PBC) eventually withdraws from pegging a variety of domestic deposit and loan interest rates, how will anticipated-but somewhat uncertain-exchange appreciation affect market-determined domestic interest rates?
Portfolio equilibrium between holding dollar and renminbi assets requires:
where i is the interest rate on a RMB asset, i* is the interest rate on a dollar asset of the same term to maturity, and IRP is the negative interest rate risk premium. Financial liberalization is an important and laudable objective for improving the efficiency of China's capital markets in the long run. Now, however, with China's economy threatened by ongoing appreciation of the renminbi, liberalizing the financial system could have perverse short-run consequences. In the face of undiminished foreign exchange risk, i.e., the probability that the renminbi could appreciate, a near zero interest rate liquidity trap is possible. Figure 6 shows China's interbank interest rate at the end of 2005 falling toward 1.37 percent as the U.S. federal funds rate (coming off all time lows) rose to 4.25 percent. Although the PBC still pegs rates on bank deposits and some loans, China's interbank interest rate is fairly freely determined. (Figure 6 also shows Japan's short-term interest rate being stuck close zero: the dreaded liquidity trap.)
If interest rates on renminbi assets don't fall immediately to the level shown in equation (2), short-term capital (hot money) flows into China as investors try to switch their dollars into renminbi. To avoid an upward exchange rate spiral, the PBC must buy dollars in the foreign exchange market. The huge buildup of dollar exchange reserves, now almost US$800 billion, and consequent internal expansion of the domestic monetary base, then drives down domestic short-term interest rates-at least until they hit zero.
But another equilibrium, where Chinese interest rates remain low but above zero, is possible. This was suggested by the swap contract between the PBC and the commercial banks described above. If new swap contracts are initiated each month so that the forward discount on the dollar is always 2.9 percent (the rate of expected and actual annual appreciation of the RMB), then the PBC could secure domestic private portfolio equilibrium by keeping China's interest rate always 2.9 percentage points less than American. Coincidentally, 2.9 percent was about the actual interest differential at the end of 2005 (figure 6). If this smooth appreciation of 2.9 percent per year is certain, then the interest differential will be dominated by E(∆S), and IRP → 0.
However, if the exchange rate moves erratically and unpredictably, then the negative risk premium becomes more important. In Japan currently, the yen/dollar rate swings erratically but has shown no clear tendency to appreciate since 1995, after which Japan bashing pretty well ceased. In order to explain the large differential of more than 4
percentage points between Japanese and American interest rates as shown in Figure 6 , the negative IRP must be very high in absolute terms even as E(∆S) → 0. Japanese banks and insurance companies own huge stocks of dollar assets whose yen value fluctuates with the yen/dollar rate. To prevent massive dishoarding of these riskier dollar assets, the yield on yen assets must be much lower, i.e., IRP << 0. In the new millennium, this foreign exchange risk explains the current persistence of Japan's zero-interest liquidity trap even in the absence of any secular tendency for the yen to appreciate (McKinnon 2005, ch. 4) .
A Concluding Note
Foreign exchange risk is a much bigger problem for countries on the periphery of the dollar standard than for the United States itself. For creditor countries such as China that have current account (saving surpluses), mercantile pressure to appreciate their currencies and become more "flexible" is misplaced. Just the expectation of (ongoing) exchange appreciation with high variance seriously disrupts the natural tendency for wage growth to balance productivity growth. Also it could create a zero-interest liquidity trap in financial markets that leaves the central bank helpless to combat future deflation arising out of actual currency appreciation-as with the earlier experience of Japan.
Exchange rate appreciation, or the threat of it, causes macroeconomic distress without having any predictable effect on the trade surpluses of creditor economies.
